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Abstract
We study the effect of different levels of information on two-sided platform profits—
under monopoly and competition. One side (developers) is always informed about all
prices and therefore forms responsive expectations. In contrast, we allow the other
side (users) to be uninformed about prices charged to developers and to hold passive
expectations. We show that platforms with more market power (monopoly) prefer
facing more informed users. In contrast, platforms with less market power (i.e., fac-
ing more intense competition) have the opposite preference: they derive higher profits
when users are less informed. The main reason is that price information leads user
expectations to be more responsive and therefore amplifies the effect of price reduc-
tions. Platforms with more market power benefit because higher responsiveness leads
to demand increases, which they are able to capture fully. Competing platforms are
affected negatively because more information intensifies price competition.
Keywords: two-sided platforms, information, responsive expectations, passive expec-
tations, wary expectations
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1 Introduction
In markets with two-sided network effects, the value that an agent derives from joining a
platform is determined by the number of agents on the other side (cross-group network
effects). Examples include payment systems like PayPal or Visa, videogame systems like
PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360, smartphone platforms like Apple’s iPhone or Google’s Android,
etc. Because of this cross-group dependency, the number of agents that join each side
ultimately depends on the prices charged to both sides. In most real-world settings, however,
some agents may not take all prices into account when forming expectations. This may be
for a number of reasons. One side (typically consumers) may simply not be informed of
the price charged to the other side. For instance, few videogame console users are aware of
the royalties that console manufacturers charge to third-party game developers. Few iPhone
users are aware of the fees charged by Apple to third-party app developers. And even
when all prices are known to everyone, consumers may not have sufficient information about
aggregate demand on each side to compute each demand’s responsiveness to price changes.
Instead, consumers typically rely on external information (e.g., press announcements, market
reports, word of mouth) to form expectations about the total number of developers that join
a given platform. Expectations formed in this way usually do not respond to changes in
platform prices.
The majority of the existing literature on two-sided platform pricing typically assumes
that agents on all sides have full information about all prices and are able to perfectly
compute their impact on platform adoption. In other words, expectations adjust perfectly
in response to changes in platform prices. In this paper we demonstrate that different
levels of information—which imply different mechanisms through which agents form rational
expectations—lead to economically meaningful differences in terms of market outcomes, firm
profits in particular.
For convenience, we label the two sides as “users” and “developers” (e.g., smartphone op-
erating systems, videogame consoles). Throughout the paper we assume that the developer
side has full information about all prices and therefore always forms responsive expectations
about user participation. In contrast, we allow the user side to be uninformed about devel-
oper prices and we assume—as is realistic—that uninformed users form passive expectations
about developer participation. In other words, when users are uninformed about developer
prices, they use external information to fix their expectation of platform adoption by devel-
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opers and do not adjust it in response to any price changes. Nevertheless, in equilibrium
passive expectations are fulfilled, i.e. are rational.
Our main results and insights are derived by comparing the scenarios with fully informed
users and fully uninformed users, for a monopoly platform and for competing platforms. We
show that a monopoly platform’s profits are higher when users are informed relative to the
case when users are uninformed. In contrast, the ranking of platform profits in a symmetric
duopoly equilibrium with fixed user market size is exactly the opposite. Competing platforms
in such a setting prefer to face uninformed rather than informed users.
We also provide several extensions of our baseline model. In one extension, we analyze
the case when only a fraction of users are informed, while the rest are uninformed. As
expected, monopoly platform profits are increasing in the fraction of informed users, while
competing platform profits are decreasing in that fraction. Furthermore, a generalized model
of competition confirms the insights derived from our baseline model: equilibrium profits are
larger with uninformed users than with informed users if and only if competition for users
is sufficiently intense.
In another extension, we allow uninformed users to hold wary expectations instead of pas-
sive expectations. Wary expectations are formed when users expect the platform to charge a
developer price that is optimal conditional on the observed user price. It is worth emphasiz-
ing that wary expectations are also rational, i.e., fulfilled in equilibrium. When uninformed
users hold wary expectations, we obtain equilibrium platform profits that are in-between
those with informed users and uninformed users forming passive expectations, both under
monopoly and under platform competition with fixed market size. In other words, competing
platforms continue to have the opposite preference regarding user information relative to a
platform monopolist.
The broader implication of our analysis is that, in two-sided markets with cross-group
network effects, the more market power platforms have, the more they prefer facing agents
that are informed about prices on all sides. In contrast, platforms with less market power
(due to more intense competition) prefer facing uninformed agents. Indeed, due to network
effects, information about prices and price changes leads agents on one side to adjust their
expectations about participation on the other side. Thus, the presence of informed agents
tends to amplify the effect of price reductions. Platforms with more market power benefit
because this leads to demand increases, which they are able to capture fully. Platforms which
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face more intense competition suffer because the presence of informed agents intensifies price
competition.
2 Related literature
The existing literature on platform pricing in the presence of network effects (one-sided and
two-sided) contains two different approaches to modeling rational expectations:1 responsive
and passive. Models with responsive expectations implicitly assume agents on all sides are
informed of all prices and capable of perfectly computing the effect of price changes on overall
demands for a given platform. In other words, expectations adjust perfectly to match realized
demands for all prices. Conversely, models with passive expectations assume that agents hold
their expectation of total demand (on the same side for one-sided networks or on the other
side for two-sided networks) fixed, irrespective of platforms’ price choices. Rationality is
then obtained by imposing that fixed expectations are correct at the equilibrium prices.
We focus our analysis on two-sided platforms. When agents on at least one side are
uninformed of the prices on the other side, passive expectations can be part of subgame
perfect equilibria. In other words, passive expectations are not “incorrect” when firm prices
deviate from the equilibrium path, simply because uninformed agents do not observe price
deviations on the other side.2 By contrast, in models with one-sided network effects, in
order to make passive expectations compatible with subgame perfection, it is necessary
to additionally assume that expectations are formed and observed by firms prior to their
pricing decisions (cf. Matutes and Vives 1996).3 In other words, customers must fix their
expectations before firms set their prices (even though customers make purchase decisions
after observing firm prices) and firms must observe those expectations.
This observation provides further justification for our focus on two-sided platforms, and
on the distinction between informed and uninformed users. In particular, in our model in-
formed users always form responsive expectations. For uninformed users, we assume through-
out most of the paper that they form passive expectations, i.e., they keep their expectations
1In models of platform adoption with network effects where platforms do not make pricing decisions (e.g.,
Church and Gandal (1992), Farrell and Saloner (1985) and (1986)), the distinction between various types of
rational expectations does not make a difference.
2We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
3Passive expectations may be part of a Nash equilibrium in models with one-sided network effects without
this additional assumption, but then they would not satisfy subgame perfection.
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fixed regardless of the price they are charged (the only price they observe). In section 6.1
we also analyze the case in which uninformed users hold wary expectations, i.e. they adjust
expectations based on the price they observe.
Most models of platform pricing with network effects rely on responsive expectations.
This approach originated with Katz and Shapiro (1986), who study competition between
incompatible technologies with direct (one-sided) network effects. A majority of the recent
literature on two-sided markets (e.g., Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007),
Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Choi (2010), Hagiu (2009), Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013),
Rochet and Tirole (2006), Weyl (2010)) also assumes responsive expectations. The typical
analysis of a monopoly two-sided platform runs as follows. For the two sides i = 1, 2, the
demand functions are given by ni = Di (nj, pi), where nj denotes the realized demand on side
j 6= i and pi denotes the price charged by the platform to side i; Di (., .) is increasing in its first
argument and decreasing in its second argument. Then all authors adopt one of two methods.
They either solve directly for (n1, n2) as a function of (p1, p2) only, and then maximize the
resulting profit expression over (p1, p2). Or they invert ni = Di (nj, pi) to express pi as a
function of (ni, nj), then replace in the formula for profit, and maximize over (n1, n2). The
problem (which arises with both methods) is that there may be multiple equilibrium solutions
(n1, n2) for a given (p1, p2). This issue is usually side-stepped by assuming platforms have
the ability to coordinate users on the allocation (n1, n2) they prefer. Parker and Van Alstyne
(2005) use a slightly different approach, by directly assuming two-sided demands that depend
on both prices: n1 = D1 (p1)+α1D2 (p2) and n2 = D2 (p2)+α2D1 (p1), where 0 < α1, α2 < 1.
Argenziano (2007) applies the global games methodology to the study of competition be-
tween one-sided networks. Each user receives a noisy signal regarding the standalone value of
a given platform, but she is still assumed capable of calculating the optimal adoption strate-
gies for all other users as a function of the platform price. Ambrus and Argenziano (2009)
show that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium when agents are hetero-
geneous. In their model too, each individual agent observes all platform prices and calculates
the resulting adoption decisions by all other agents. Thus, all of these papers rely on re-
sponsive expectations.
Passive expectations were first introduced in the economic literature on one-sided network
effects by Katz and Shapiro (1985). This was also the first paper to explicitly distinguish
passive expectations from responsive expectations.4 In particular, Katz and Shapiro (1985)
4Matutes and Vives (1996) make this distinction in a model of financial intermediation.
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study Cournot competition between n firms (technologies) with direct network effects. In
the main text of the paper, the authors analyze the case of passive expectations: each firm
chooses its output taking other firms’ decisions and users’ expectations regarding firms’ out-
puts as fixed. In the appendix, the authors also analyze the case of responsive expectations,
where users’ expectations adjust (correctly) based on firms’ output decisions. They confirm
that most of their analysis applies to both cases but do not compare firms’ equilibrium prof-
its and prices under the two types of expectations. The same Cournot model with passive
and responsive expectations is also used by Economides (1996) to study the incentives of a
network leader to invite entry of competing followers.
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) is the only two-sided model we are aware of that in-
corporates passive expectations. Moreover, they investigate the difference in equilibrium
outcomes between passive and responsive expectations. In their paper, users on both sides
are differentiated by the intensity of their indirect network effects. With fixed rational ex-
pectations, their two-sided demands are ni = Di
(
nej , pi
)
, where nej is the demand on side j
expected by agents on side i. The platform maximizes Π = p1D1 (n
e
2, p1) + p2D2 (n
e
1, p2)
over (p1, p2) treating (n
e
1, n
e
2) as exogenously given. Then rational expectations require
(n1, n2) = (n
e
1, n
e
2), which closes the loop by determining equilibrium demands and prices.
The same approach is used for competing platforms. Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) show
that responsive expectations lead to wider participation on the platform. In our paper, we
undertake a systematic investigation of how different levels of user information—leading to
different types of expectations—affect the equilibrium outcome. Aside from passive and
responsive expectations—investigated by Gabszewicz and Wauthy—we also analyze wary
expectations and a hybrid model in which users with different expectation types are present
in the market.
More recently, two papers have explicitly pointed out the impact of different user ex-
pectations (passive and responsive) on equilibrium allocations in markets with direct (i.e.,
one-sided) network effects. Griva and Vettas (2011) study price competition between two
firms which are both horizontally and vertically differentiated. They find that competition
under responsive expectations tends to be more intense and results in larger market shares
captured by the high-quality firm, relative to the case with fixed expectations. Hurkens
and Lopez (2012) study the impact of competition between communication networks. They
show that replacing the standard assumption of responsive consumer expectations with a
more realistic assumption of passive consumer expectations leads to radically different con-
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clusions regarding firm preferences for termination charges. Specifically, with responsive
consumer expectations, firms prefer lower (below-cost) termination charges. Instead, with
passive consumer expectations, firms prefer above cost termination charges, consistent with
the real-world tension between mobile operators and their regulators.
There are three key differences between these two papers and our analysis. First, both
papers rely on models with one-sided network effects, whereas our main model is two-sided.
Second, they focus on duopoly settings only, whereas we are interested in comparing the im-
pact of expectations in monopoly and duopoly contexts. Indeed, a key insight that emerges
from our analysis is that the effect of user information about prices is very different de-
pending on the market structure. Third, Griva and Vettas (2011) and Hurkens and Lopez
(2012) only consider two extreme cases—all users holding passive expectations and all users
holding responsive expectations. In contrast, we extend our baseline model to encompass
expectation formation mechanisms in-between the extremes: a continuous hybrid of passive
and responsive expectations, and wary expectations. Thus, we are able to study the effect
of small changes in the nature of user expectations on market equilibria and firm profits.
Evans and Schmalensee (2010) study platform adoption in the presence of network effects
with imperfect, dynamic adjustments of user participation decisions. At a high level, our
paper is related to theirs in the effort to formally capture imperfections in the information
held by users—a prevalent phenomenon in real-world settings. The key difference is that in
their model, platform prices are fixed and the focus is on determining conditions (critical
mass) under which the imperfect dynamic adjustment process converges to positive levels of
platform adoption.
Finally, our analysis of user information about two-sided platform prices is related to the
mechanisms of belief formation studied in the vertical contracting literature (Hart and Tirole
1990, McAfee and Schwartz 1994, Rey and Verge 2004). In that literature, a downstream
firm D receiving an unexpected (out of equilibrium) offer from an upstream monopolist U
must form beliefs about the changes in U’s offers to D’s rivals (which D does not observe).
Passive expectations in our context correspond to the notion of passive beliefs in the vertical
contracting context: D does not adjust its beliefs about contracts offered to rivals when D
receives an unexpected offer from U. We also introduce the notion of wary expectations as
a concept directly drawn from the notion of wary beliefs studied by McAfee and Schwartz
(1994) and Rey and Verge (2004). In vertical contracting, D holds wary beliefs if, whenever
it receives an unexpected offer, it anticipates that U also optimally adjusts its offers to D’s
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rivals given the offer just received by D. In our context, a user who does not observe the price
pd charged by a two-sided platform to developers holds wary expectations if, when presented
with a price pu, she assumes that the platform’s price pd maximizes the platform’s profits
given pu.
3 Informed vs. Uninformed Users—Monopoly Plat-
form
Consider a monopoly two-sided platform. For convenience of reference, suppose it is a
videogame console connecting users (u) with game developers (d). We assume linear demand
on both sides:
nu = 1 + αun
e
d − pu and nd = αdneu − pd . (1)
Thus, demand on each side depends positively on the expectation of participation on
the other side: users expect ned developers to join and developers expect n
e
u users to join.
The surplus derived by a user from the participation of each developer is αu > 0, while the
profit made by each developer on every platform user is αd > 0. We assume the following
condition holds throughout the paper, which ensures all monopoly maximization problems
are well-behaved:5
αu + αd < 2 .
In this formulation, the platform has standalone value normalized to 1 for every user
but no standalone value for developers. Standalone values have no bearing on our results,
therefore we have chosen the simplest possible formulation, with positive standalone value
on one side (u) only. This is also quite realistic given the videogame console example we
have in mind: the console may offer first-party games, web browsing and streaming movie
services to users, but writing games for a console with no users is arguably worthless for
developers.
3.1 Information and expectations
Throughout the paper we assume that all developers are informed of all prices and therefore
hold responsive expectations about user participation. In other words, their expectations
5This condition also implies αuαd < 1.
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about user participation always match realized user participation:
neu = nu for any given price pair (pu, pd) .
In contrast, we compare two polar cases on the user side:
(i) users are fully informed and therefore hold responsive expectations,
(ii) users are uninformed and hold passive expectations.
The asymmetry between users and developers in information about prices charged to the
other side is realistic. Game developers are usually aware of console prices and have a good
understanding of console user demand. On the other hand, most users have limited informa-
tion about and understanding of the royalty arrangements between console manufacturers
and game developers (or between Apple and iPhone app developers). These users most likely
form their expectations of developer participation based on external information (e.g. news
articles, word-of-mouth) and do not adjust them in response to the prices actually charged
by platforms.6
3.2 Informed users
In this scenario, all users observe developer prices pd and adjust their expectations accord-
ingly, so that ned matches realized developer participation nd for any price pair (pu, pd) chosen
by the platform. Two-sided demands from (1) can therefore be written:
nu = 1 + αund − pu and nd = αdnu − pd .
This is the standard formulation used in most of the two-sided market literature. It
is straightforward to solve the last two equations for (nu, nd) as functions of (pu, pd) only,
and then optimize the platform’s profits punu + pdnd directly over (pu, pd). We obtain the
following profit-maximizing prices and demands:
p∗u =
2− αd (αd + αu)
4− (αd + αu)2
and p∗d =
αd − αu
4− (αd + αu)2
, (2)
6Allowing both sides to be uninformed does not change our analysis in any meaningful way. All key
results in the propositions below remain unchanged.
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n∗u =
2
4− (αd + αu)2
and n∗d =
αd + αu
4− (αd + αu)2
. (3)
This leads to optimal platform profits:
Π∗M (informed) =
1
4− (αd + αu)2
. (4)
3.3 Uninformed users
In this scenario, users do not observe developer prices and do not adjust their expectations
regarding developer participation (ned) in response to any changes in platform prices (pd
or pu). In turn, the platform has no choice but to treat users’ passive expectations n
e
d as
fixed when it sets its prices. Expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium. From the platform’s
perspective, two-sided realized demands now depend not just on prices but also on users’
passive expectations ned:
nu = 1 + αun
e
d − pu and nd = αd + αuαdned − pd − αdpu .
After optimizing the platform’s profits punu+pdnd over (pu, pd), we obtain prices and real-
ized demands p∗u (n
e
d), p
∗
d (n
e
d), n
∗
u (n
e
d) and n
∗
d (n
e
d), all of which depend on n
e
d. In equilibrium
the rationality condition n∗d (n
e
d) = n
e
d must be satisfied. It directly leads to
p∗u =
2− α2d
4− (αd + αu)αd and p
∗
d =
αd
4− (αd + αu)αd , (5)
n∗u =
2
4− (αd + αu)αd and n
∗
d =
αd
4− (αd + αu)αd . (6)
The resulting optimal platform profits are
Π∗M (uninformed) =
4− α2d
(4− (αd + αu)αd)2
. (7)
3.4 Profit comparison and discussion
We are interested in determining the effect of user expectations on platform profits. Com-
paring (4) and (7) leads to:
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Proposition 1 A monopoly platform earns higher profits when users are informed than
when users are uninformed, i.e.,
Π∗M (uninformed) < Π
∗
M (informed) .
This result is interpreted as follows. When all agents are informed, the platform is able
to“commit” to the prices that maximize profits under rational expectations. Suppose now
the price charged to developers is no longer observed by users, i.e. all users switch from being
informed to being uninformed. Uninformed users (with passive expectations) do not adjust
their expectations in response to changes in the developer price, therefore the platform is
now tempted to increase the developer price above the level that was optimal with fully
informed agents on both sides. But users anticipate this behavior ex-ante and adjust their
expectations accordingly, which overall leads to lower platform profits. In other words,
from the platform’s perspective, facing uninformed users is akin to being unable to credibly
announce (commit to) the optimal developer price to users. Conversely, uninformed users
are in effect credibly committed to ignore the platform’s price changes when forming their
expectations. This leads the platform to charge ex-post a developer price that is too high
for the platform’s own good ex-ante.7
It is in fact possible to prove more generally (i.e., regardless of the shape of demand
functions) that the case with fully informed users maximizes monopoly platform’s profits
across all settings with rational expectations.
Proposition 2 A monopoly two-sided platform achieves maximum profits in a rational ex-
pectations equilibrium when all agents on both sides are informed.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The logic behind this result is straightforward. Since expectations are fulfilled in equi-
librium, the platform can replicate any rational expectations market allocation under the
scenario with fully informed agents on both sides. However, this is not true if some users
are not informed. In the presence of uninformed users, users’ expectations are not fully re-
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation in terms of the ability to
commit to prices.
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sponsive and therefore some rational expectations market allocations may not be attainable,
which may prevent the platform from achieving the first-best outcome.
The result in Propositions 1 and 2 has two important implications. First, whenever
feasible, a monopoly two-sided platform would like to inform all users of the prices charged
to developers and of the way in which developer demand responds to price changes.8 As we
will see in the next section, the opposite is true for competing platforms.
Second, from a social welfare standpoint, not only the platform, but also users and
developers are better off when users are informed. Indeed, the expressions of equilibrium
user and developer surplus are
Wu =
(1 + αun
∗
d)
4
and Wd =
(1 + αun
∗
u)
4
.
Both surpluses are increasing in (n∗u, n
∗
d), while user and developer demands are higher in the
equilibrium with informed users than in the equilibrium with uninformed users (cf expressions
(3) and (6)). Consequently, in the case of a platform monopolist, information disclosure is
better for users, developers, the platform and, hence, for total social welfare. This means
that in this case a policy that mandates information disclosure would be superfluous, since
it is already in the best interest of the platform.
4 Informed vs. Uninformed Users—Competing Plat-
forms
Let us now turn to the case of competition between two symmetric platforms. Users are dis-
tributed along a Hotelling segment [0, 1] with density 1 and transportation costs t > 0. They
are interested in joining at most one platform (i.e., they singlehome). From the perspective
of developers, the two platforms are identical, but developers are allowed to multihome, i.e.,
join both platforms.9 Developers are differentiated by the fixed cost they incur when joining
each platform. The fixed cost per platform is the same regardless of whether a developer joins
one or both platforms, i.e., there are no economies of scope in joining multiple platforms.
8In this section we only compare the extreme cases where all users are informed or all users are uninformed.
We study a model with heterogeneous users in Section 6.2.
9In the working paper version, we have also analyzed the corresponding model with singlehoming on both
sides. The main result (ranking of profits under various types of expectations) is unchanged.
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User demands are:
nu1 =
1
2
+
αu (n
e
d1 − ned2) + pu2 − pu1
2t
for platform 1, and nu2 = 1− nu1 for platform 2, where ned1 and ned2 are users’ expectations
about developer participation on each platform. Developer demands are nd1 = αdn
e
u1 − pd1
for platform 1, and nd2 = αdn
e
u2 − pd2 for platform 2.
In order to guarantee all optimization problems with competing platforms are well-
behaved, we assume throughout the paper:
t > αuαd .
As in the previous section, all developers are informed and therefore hold responsive
expectations about user participation, i.e., neui = nui for i = 1, 2. Once again, we focus on
the two polar cases on the user side: fully informed users and fully uninformed users.
4.1 Informed users
In this case, all users adjust their expectations nedi to match realized developer participation
ndi (i = 1, 2) for any prices chosen by the two platforms. Two-sided demands are then:
nu1 =
1
2
+
αu (nd1 − nd2) + pu2 − pu1
2t
and nd1 = αdnu1 − pd1 ,
nu2 = 1− nu1 and nd2 = αdnu2 − pd2 .
It is straightforward to solve for user and developer demands as functions of prices:
nu1 =
1
2
+
pu2 − pu1 + αu (pd2 − pd1)
2 (t− αuαd)
nd1 =
αd
2
+
αd (pu2 − pu1) + αdαupd2 − (2t− αdαu) pd1
2 (t− αuαd) .
Platforms simultaneously choose prices to maximize profits, puinui + pdindi for i = 1, 2.
Taking the first-order conditions of platform i’s profits in pui and pdi and solving for the
symmetric equilibrium, we obtain the following equilibrium prices and demands:
p∗u = t−
3αdαu
4
− α
2
d
4
and p∗d =
αd − αu
4
,
13
n∗u =
1
2
and n∗d =
αd + αu
4
.
Equilibrium profits are:
Π∗C (informed) =
t
2
− α
2
d
16
− 6αdαu + α
2
u
16
. (8)
4.2 Uninformed users
In this scenario, users do not observe (pd1, pd2) and do not adjust their expectations n
e
di to
any changes in platforms’ prices. Platform 1’s profits are then simply:
pu1nu1 + pd1nd1 = (pu1 + αdpd1)
(
1
2
+
αu (n
e
d1 − ned2) + pu2 − pu1
2t
)
− p2d1 .
Taking the first order conditions in (pu1, pd1) with fixed (n
e
d1, n
e
d2) and imposing the
symmetric equilibrium condition nu1 = nu2 =
1
2
and the rational expectations condition
nd1 = nd2 = n
e
d1 = n
e
d2, we obtain the following equilibrium prices and demands:
p∗u = t−
α2d
4
and p∗d =
αd
4
,
n∗u =
1
2
and n∗d =
αd
4
,
resulting in equilibrium profits:
Π∗C (uninformed) =
t
2
− α
2
d
16
. (9)
4.3 Comparison and discussion
Comparing equilibrium profit expressions (8) and (9) leads to:
Proposition 3 In the symmetric duopoly equilibrium with fixed Hotelling competition for
users, platform profits are higher when all users are uninformed relative to the case when all
users are informed:
Π∗C (uninformed) > Π
∗
C (informed) .
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Griva and Vettas (2011) obtain a similar result in a one-sided framework: they show that
switching from passive to responsive expectations tends to lead to more intense competition
in a duopoly with one-sided network effects.
Note that in Proposition 3 users are informed or uninformed at the industry level, i.e.,
they either know the developer prices for both platforms or for neither.10 Thus, the result
in Proposition 3 implies that an industry association representing platform interests would
prefer to minimize information released to users about developer prices. This stands in
contrast to the case when the industry is monopolized by one platform - the latter always
has an incentive to inform users (cf. Proposition 1).
The reason for this reversion of incentives to inform is as follows. When platforms
compete for share in a market of fixed size on at least one side, each platform’s incentives to
lower price are strongest when users are informed of all prices. Indeed, such users respond to
price decreases in two ways: they adjust their own demand, as well as their expectation of
developer demand—both upwards. This creates intense price competition. With uninformed
users, price competition is less severe because users completely ignore price cuts on the
developer side and only consider the impact of a lower user price on their own participation
instead of also factoring the impact of increased participation by users on developer demand.
Let us now consider the social welfare perspective. With competing platforms, as pre-
viously in the monopoly case, user and developer surpluses are increasing in equilibrium
realized demands (n∗u, n
∗
d) and these demands are (weakly) larger when users are informed.
Thus, both users and developers prefer the scenario with uninformed users. This means that
user and developer preferences are misaligned with the platforms’ preferences. Consequently,
a policy that mandates full information disclosure would help increase user and developer
surplus, though it would hurt platforms’ profits.
5 Price comparison
Like profits, the equilibrium pricing structures are different depending on whether users are
informed or uninformed. Unlike profits, prices also have somewhat different comparative
statics in the model parameters. This should not be too surprising: two-sided platforms
10The determination of the quilibrium in which each individual platform is able to choose whether or not
to inform its users lies beyond the scope of this paper.
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typically re-adjust their two-dimensional pricing structures (e.g. increase one price and
decrease the other) in response to changes in the external environment (e.g. the extent of
information held by users).
Specifically, comparing monopoly platform prices (2) and (5), it is straightforward to
show that:
p∗u (informed) ≤ p∗u (uninformed)⇐⇒ αu ≤ αd
p∗d (informed) ≤ p∗d (uninformed)⇐⇒ αd (αu + αd) > 2 .
In both information scenarios, the respective equilibrium demands (3) and (6) are increasing
in both network effects parameters αu and αd, as expected. On the other hand, the compar-
ative statics of equilibrium prices (2) and (5) in αu and αd are less trivial. We summarize
them in the following table:
Monopoly user price p∗u Monopoly developer price p∗d
Informed
users
negative iff 2 < αd (αd + αu)
increasing in αu iff
4αu > αd (αd + αu)
2
decreasing in αd iff
4αd > αu (αd + αu)
2
negative iff αd < αu
increasing in αd iff
(3αu − αd) (αu + αd) < 4
decreasing in αu iff
(3αd − αu) (αu + αd) < 4
Uninformed
users
negative iff 2 < α2d
increasing in αu iff 2 > α
2
d
decreasing in αd iff
4αd > αu
(
2 + α2d
)
always positive
always increasing in αd
always increasing in αu
Turning now to competing platform prices, we have:
p∗u (informed) < p
∗
u (uninformed) for all αu, αd ,
p∗d (informed) < p
∗
d (uninformed) for all αu, αd .
and the differences in comparative statics are summarized in the following table:
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Duopoly user price p∗u Duopoly developer price p∗d
Informed
users
negative iff t <
(
3αdαu + α
2
d
)
/4
decreasing in αu and αd
negative iff αd < αu
increasing in αd; decreasing in αu
Uninformed
users
negative iff t < α2d/4
decreasing in αd; constant in αu
always positive
increasing in αd; constant in αu
These differences can have significant empirical implications. For instance, a monopoly
two-sided platform facing uninformed users never subsidizes developers, but it might do so
when users are informed (when αu > αd). Again, this is because uninformed users are less
responsive to price cuts, so there is less to be gained from lowering prices on either side.
Furthermore, different comparative statics in (αu, αd) imply that equilibrium prices respond
differently to changes in the network effects parameters under different information scenarios.
Thus, if one were to estimate network effects parameters based on observed prices, results
would be different depending on the level of user information.
6 Extensions
In this section, we briefly discuss three extensions, which provide robustness checks to our
simple model from the previous sections.
6.1 Wary expectations
When users are uninformed, they cannot revise their expectations regarding developer par-
ticipation based on changes in developer prices (which they do not observe). However, users
may adjust expectations based on changes in user prices (which they observe). Accordingly,
in this section we study an alternative to the passive expectations studied above by assum-
ing uninformed users hold wary expectations. Our concept of wary expectations is directly
adapted from the concept of wary beliefs from the vertical contracting literature (McAfee
and Schwartz (1994), Rey and Verge (2004)). An uninformed user who does not observe de-
veloper prices is said to hold wary expectations if, when presented with any off-equilibrium
price pu, she assumes that the platform has also adjusted its price to developers, pd, to
maximize profits, given pu. This leads the user to form her expectation of the number of
developers who join the platform based on the price that she observes: ned (pu).
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The main difference relative to passive expectations is that wary users attempt to make
the optimal inference about developer prices, based on the information available to them, i.e.
pu and the structure of developer demand. Thus, wary expectations can be viewed as lying
somewhere in-between the two polar extremes of perfectly responsive and perfectly passive
expectations in terms of user information and responsiveness to platform prices.
Consistent with this interpretation, in Appendix A.2, we show that platform profits
when all users are uninformed and hold wary expectations are in-between profits with fully
informed users and profits with fully uninformed users holding passive expectations. This
result holds both with a monopoly and with competing platforms. In other words:
Π∗M (informed) > Π
∗
M (uninformed-wary) > Π
∗
M (uninformed-passive)
and Π∗C (uninformed-passive) > Π
∗
C (uninformed-wary) > Π
∗
C (informed) .
These results confirm the main insights derived in Sections 3 and 4. A monopoly platform
prefers to face more informed users, where one can view uninformed wary users as being more
informed than uninformed passive users. Conversely, competing platforms prefer to face less
informed users. In both cases, the explanation is similar to the one provided in Sections 3
and 4: user information leads to more price responsiveness, which is good for a monopolist
but bad for competing platforms in a market of fixed size.
6.2 Heterogeneous users
A different way of modelling intermediate levels of user information is to consider a hybrid
scenario in which some users are informed, while others are uninformed and hold passive
expectations. Indeed, up to now we have only considered “pure” forms of user information
and expectations, i.e. scenarios in which all users held the same amount of information
and the same type of expectation. We are particularly interested in seeing how equilibrium
platform profits respond to small changes in the level of information held by users.
Specifically, assume that a fraction λ of users are informed, while the remaining fraction
(1− λ) of users are uninformed and hold passive expectations. All developers are informed
as before. We have studied the extreme cases λ = 1 (all users are informed) and λ = 0 (all
users are uninformed and passive) in Sections 3 and 4.
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In Appendix A.3 we show that the optimal profits for a monopoly platform are
Π∗M (λ) =
4− (αd + λαu)2
(4− (αd + αu) (αd + λαu))2
, (10)
while in Appendix A.4 we show that the equilibrium platform profits in the Hotelling duopoly
from Section 4 are
Π∗C (λ) =
t
2
− α
2
d
16
− 6αdαuλ+ α
2
uλ
2
16
. (11)
Thus, as one might expect based on the results in Propositions 1 and 3, Π∗M (λ) is
increasing in λ, while Π∗C (λ) is decreasing. In other words, a monopoly platform is always
better off when it faces more informed users. By contrast, platforms competing for share in
a market of fixed size on at least one side are worse off when there are more informed users.
6.3 Generalized competition
Proposition 3 implies that competing platforms with fixed market size on at least one side are
better off when users are uninformed about developer prices—the opposite implication than
for a monopoly platform (Propositions 1 and 2). In Appendix A.4, we use a more general
model of platform competition to show that equilibrium profits are larger with uninformed
users than with informed users if and only if competition for users is sufficiently intense.
Figure 1 below illustrates this result. In this model, the intensity of competition is measured
by a parameter x, which varies between x = 0 (each platform is a monopolist as in Section 3)
to x = 1 (Hotelling competition with fixed market size as in Section 4).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Figure 1: Platform profits with fully informed (thick line) and fully uninformed users (thin
line), both as functions of x, with parameter values t = 0.5, αu = 0.4 and αd = 0.6.
One can then combine generalized competition (intensity of competition x) with hetero-
geneous user information (fraction of informed users λ). We explicitly solve this model and
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derive equilibrium platform profits Π∗C (x, λ) in Appendix A.4. Here let us simply emphasize
the following points. When x = 1, the model is equivalent to the competition scenario with
fixed user market size: equilibrium platform profits are decreasing in λ (cf. Section 6.2).
When x = 0, the model is equivalent to two independent two-sided monopolies, so that equi-
librium profits are increasing in λ. As x increases from 0 to 1, equilibrium profits Π∗C (x, λ)
are first increasing, then single-peaked, and lastly decreasing in λ. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.36
0.37
0.38
0.39
(a) Π∗C (0, λ)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.315
0.320
(b) Π∗C (0.35, λ)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.22
0.24
(c) Π∗C (0.8, λ)
Figure 2: Competing platform profits (Π∗C (x, λ)), as a function of λ, for three different values
of x. All graphs have parameters t = 0.5, αu = 0.5, αd = 0.7.
Thus, for general x ∈ (0, 1), the fraction of informed users λ has two conflicting effects:
user market expansion through the Hotelling hinterlands tends to make increases in λ de-
sirable for the two platforms, whereas competition for users on the interior of the Hotelling
segment tends to make increases in λ undesirable (increased competitive pressure).
In other words, platforms benefit from increased information in the market if compe-
tition is not too intense. As competitive pressure increases, information starts having a
negative effect on platform profits. This is because the degree of information available in
the market (captured by λ and taken as exogenously given) and the intensity of platform
competition (captured by x and also taken as exogenously given) tend to be substitutes from
the perspective of platform profits.
7 Conclusions
This paper has explored how equilibrium outcomes in a two-sided platform market are af-
fected by different levels of user information about prices charged to the other side.
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We have shown that the level of user information affects platform profits differently
depending on market structure. Broadly speaking, platforms with more market power prefer
facing more informed users. Platforms that compete in a market of fixed size have the
opposite preference: they derive higher profits when users are less informed and therefore
have less responsive expectations. The main reason is that information about prices amplifies
the effect of price reductions. For platforms with market power, this is good news because
they can capture the demand increases and achieve higher profits. For competing platforms,
more information is typically bad news because it intensifies price competition.
From a strategy perspective, these results imply that platforms have incentives to af-
fect the information held by users about prices charged to the other side of the market. A
monopoly platform would always wish to inform and educate users about developer prices
and the structure of developer demand. Platforms facing intense competition wish to min-
imize the information provided to users. Finally, platforms facing competition of moderate
intensity may pursue an interior, ideal level of information to be provided (cf. Section 6.3).
Finally, from a policy perspective, our results imply that mandating full information
disclosure by platforms leads to an increase in user as well as developer surplus in the
case of competing platforms with fixed market size. Indeed, in that scenario, mandating
information disclosure unambiguously leads to lower prices on both sides of the market and
higher developer demand (see price and demand expressions in Section 4).
In the case of a monopoly platform, mandating information disclosure leads to higher
demands on both sides (see expressions (3) and (6)), which implies that surplus on both
sides is also higher under full information (even though prices may be higher or lower, as
discussed in Section 5). Here, however, mandating information disclosure is superfluous
because it is also in the best interest of the platform. On the other hand, with competing
platforms, the policy maker has to weigh the interests of users and developers against those
of the platforms.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of proposition 2
Let two-sided demands beDu (n
e
d, pu) andDd (n
e
u, pd) and define the corresponding inverse demand
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functions D˜u (pu, pd) and D˜d (pu, pd) as the solutions (nu, nd) to the system of two equations:
nu = Du (nd, pu) and nd = Dd (nu, pd) .
Denote by (p∗u, p
∗
d) the profit-maximizing prices when all agents on both sides are informed and
therefore hold responsive expectations:
(p∗u, p
∗
d) = arg max
pu,pd
{
puD˜u (pu, pd) + pdD˜d (pu, pd)
}
.
Consider now some other rational expectations equilibrium in which the platform’s profit-
maximizing prices are p̂u and p̂d and resulting two-sided demands are n̂u and n̂d (for example,
this could be the profit-maximizing equilibrium when a fraction of agents on each side are unin-
formed and hold passive expectations). Since expectations are fulfilled at the equilibrium prices,
we must have:
n̂u = Du (n̂d, p̂u) and n̂d = Dd (n̂u, p̂d) ,
so that:
n̂u = D˜u (p̂u,p̂d) and n̂d = D˜d (p̂u,p̂d) ,
which means that platform profits in this equilibrium are equal to p̂uD˜u (p̂u,p̂d)+p̂dD˜d (p̂u,p̂d). But
by definition, (p∗u, p
∗
d) maximizes puD˜u (pu, pd) + pdD˜d (pu, pd) over the (pu, pd) space, therefore
the platform’s optimal profits are always highest with fully informed agents on both sides.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Since expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium,
the platform can replicate any rational expectations market allocation (p̂u,p̂d,n̂u,n̂d) under full
information on both sides, simply by charging (p̂u,p̂d). But by definition it can do at least as well
in terms of profits by charging (p∗u, p
∗
d).
A.2 Uninformed users with wary expectations
A.2.1 Monopoly
When all users are uninformed and hold wary expectations, two-sided demands are:
nu = 1 + αun
e
d (pu)− pu and nd = αdnu − pd ,
where ned (pu) is the wary expectation formed by users about the number of participating developers.
22
In calculating ned (pu), users assume the platform sets pd optimally given pu.
Denote by ped (pu) the price that users with wary expectations anticipate the platform is charg-
ing. Thus, ped (pu) and n
e
d (pu) are determined by maximizing profits punu + pdnd over pd (with
pu and n
e
d taken as exogenously given), and then imposing nd = n
e
d. In other words, when users
form wary expectations, they take into account that the platform cannot influence their expecta-
tions once pu is fixed, but they impose rationality of those expectations, i.e., the developer demand
resulting from the platform’s hypothetical optimization must be consistent with (equal to) users’
expectations.
The platform’s profits can be expressed as:
punu + pdnd = (pu + αdpd) [1 + αun
e
d − pu]− p2d .
Taking the first-order condition in pd and imposing nd = n
e
d, we obtain:
ned (pu) = p
e
d (pu) =
αd (1− pu)
2− αuαd .
With the expression of user wary expectations in hand, we can now turn to the actual optimization
of platform profits:
punu + pdnd =
2 (pu + αdpd) (1− pu)
2− αuαd − p
2
d ,
which the platform maximizes over (pu, pd). It is straightforward to obtain:
p∗u =
2− αuαd − α2d
4− 2αuαd − α2d
and p∗d =
αd
4− 2αuαd − α2d
, (12)
n∗u =
2
4− 2αuαd − α2d
and n∗d =
αd
4− 2αuαd − α2d
. (13)
Note in particular that n∗d = n
e
d (p
∗
u), i.e. wary expectations are rational, as noted from the outset.
The resulting platform profits are:
Π∗M (uninformed-wary) =
1
4− 2αuαd − α2d
. (14)
Comparing (14) with (4) and (7) yields:
Π∗M (informed) > Π
∗
M (uninformed-wary) > Π
∗
M (uninformed-passive) .
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A.2.2 Competition
Let us now turn to the Hotelling duopoly case, the same as the one studied in Section 4, except that
now users are uninformed and hold wary expectations. Specifically, users form wary expectations
ned1 and n
e
d2 by assuming the two platforms’ developer prices pd1 and pd2 are set optimally (Nash
equilibrium) given (pu1, pu2) and (n
e
d1, n
e
d2). The expectations n
e
d1 and n
e
d2, which depend on pu1
and pu2, are determined by optimizing platform 1’s profits over pd1:
pu1nu1 + pd1nd1 = (pu1 + αdpd1)
[
1
2
+
αu (n
e
d1 − ned2) + pu2 − pu1
2t
]
− p2d1 .
Taking the first-order condition in pd1 (this is the platform optimization problem that users assume
is taking place) yields:
ped1 =
αd
4
+
αuαd (n
e
d1 − ned2) + αd (pu2 − pu1)
4t
.
Similarly for platform 2 and ped2.
At these prices:
nd1 − nd2 = αd (nu1 − nu2)− (ped1 − ped2) =
αdαu (n
e
d1 − ned2) + αd (pu2 − pu1)
2t
.
Finally, imposing the rationality condition nd1 = n
e
d1 and nd2 = n
e
d2, we obtain:
ned1 − ned2 = ped1 − ped2 =
αd (pu2 − pu1)
2t− αdαu .
Using the last equation, we can express user demand as a function of prices only:
nu1 =
1
2
+
pu2 − pu1
2t− αuαd .
We can now write platform 1’s profits as:
pu1nu1 + pd1nd1 = (pu1 + αdpd1)
(
1
2
+
pu2 − pu1
2t− αuαd
)
− p2d1 .
Taking the first-order conditions in pu1 and pu2 and imposing the condition for a symmetric
equilibrium, we obtain:
p∗u = t−
αdαu
2
− α
2
d
4
and p∗d =
αd
4
,
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n∗u =
1
2
and n∗d =
αd
4
.
leading to equilibrium profits:
Π∗C (uninformed-wary) =
t
2
− αdαu
4
− α
2
d
16
. (15)
Comparing (15) with (8) and (9) yields:
Π∗C (uninformed-passive) > Π
∗
C (uninformed-wary) > Π
∗
C (informed) .
A.3 Heterogeneous users—Monopoly
Here, we derive the expressions of optimal prices, demands and profits for a monopoly platform,
when a proportion λ of users is informed and a fraction (1− λ) is uninformed and holds passive
expectations ned. Two-sided demands are:
nu = λ (1 + αund − pu) + (1− λ) (1 + αuned − pu) ,
nd = αdnu − pd .
Solving for realized demands (nu, nd) as functions of prices (pu, pd) and fixed expectations n
e
d
we obtain:
nu =
1 + αu (1− λ)ned − pu − αuλpd
1− αuαdλ ,
nd =
αd + αuαd (1− λ)ned − αdpu − pd
1− αuαdλ .
Plugging these two expressions in the expression of platform profits Π = punu + pdnd, taking
the two first order conditions in (pu, pd) and imposing the rational expectations condition n
∗
d = n
e
d
in equilibrium, we obtain:
n∗u −
p∗u + αdp
∗
d
1− αuαdλ = 0 ,
n∗d −
αuλp
∗
u + p
∗
d
1− αuαdλ = 0 .
Furthermore, evaluating the expressions of (nu, nd) as functions of (pu, pd, n
e
d) in equilibrium,
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we also have:
(1− αuαdλ)n∗u − αu (1− λ)n∗d = 1− p∗u − αuλp∗d ,
(1− αuαd)n∗d = αd − αdp∗u − p∗d .
We can then solve the last 4 equations for the equilibrium prices and demands, obtaining:
p∗u =
2− αd (αd + αuλ)
4− (αu + αd) (αd + αuλ) and p
∗
d =
αd − αuλ
4− (αu + αd) (αd + αuλ) ,
n∗u =
2
4− (αu + αd) (αd + αuλ) and n
∗
d =
αd + αuλ
4− (αu + αd) (αd + αuλ) .
Finally, equilibrium monopoly profits are:
Π∗M (λ) =
4− (αd + αuλ)2
(4− (αu + αd) (αd + αuλ))2
.
Setting λ = 1 we obtain (2), (3) and (4). Setting λ = 0, we obtain (5), (6) and (7).
A.4 Heterogeneous users—Generalized competition
Here, we directly treat the general duopoly model with heterogeneous users. The user market is
composed of three segments: the Hotelling segment of density x and two symmetric “hinterlands”
of density (1− x), on which user demand is identical to the demand for a monopoly platform from
Section 3. A fraction λ of users is informed, while a fraction (1− λ) is uninformed and holds
passive expectations. The distribution (λ, 1− λ) is independent of the position of a given user on
the Hotelling line with hinterlands. The structure of developer demand remains unchanged, i.e.
each platform acts as a monopolist vis-a-vis developers.
User demand for platform 1 is:
nu1 = λ
(
x
(
1
2
+
αu (nd1 − nd2)− (pu1 − pu2)
2t
)
+ (1− x) (1 + αund1 − pu1)
)
+ (1− λ)
(
x
(
1
2
+
αu (n
e
d1 − ned2)− (pu1 − pu2)
2t
)
+ (1− x) (1 + αuned1 − pu1)
)
= 1− x
2
+ x
(
αu (λnd1 + (1− λ)ned1 − λnd2 − (1− λ)ned2)− (pu1 − pu2)
2t
)
+ (1− x) (αu (λnd1 + (1− λ)ned1)− pu1)
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while developer demand for platform 1 is:
nd1 = αdnu1 − pd1
and symmetrically for platform 2.
Note that λ = 0 corresponds to the generalized duopoly scenario discussed at the end of
Section 4, while x = 0 and x = 1 correspond to the hybrid scenarios studied in Section 6.2.
To determine the pricing equilibrium, we need first to determine demands as functions of prices
and constants (including passive expectations held by a fraction (1− λ) of users). To do that, we
first determine (using nd1 ± nd2 = αd (nu1 ± nu2)− (pd1 ± pd2)):
nu1 + nu2 =
2− x+ (1− x) ((1− λ)αu (ned1 + ned2)− (pu1 + pu2)− λαu (pd1 + pd2))
1− (1− x)λαuαd , (16)
nu1 − nu2 = (x+ t (1− x)) ((1− λ)αu (n
e
d1 − ned2)− (pu1 − pu2)− λαu (pd1 − pd2))
t− [x+ t (1− x)]λαuαd . (17)
Platform 1’s profits are pu1nu1 + pd1nd1, which can be re-written (pu1 + αdpd1)nu1 − p2d1. In
this expression, nu1 is obtained by adding (16) and (17) and dividing by 2. In the symmetric
equilibrium, expectations by uninformed users are fulfilled. Taking the first order conditions of the
profit function in pu1 and pd1 and evaluating at equilibrium values, we obtain:
n∗u = A (x, λ) (p
∗
u + αdp
∗
d) , (18)
n∗u = B (λ) p
∗
d , (19)
where we have denoted:
A (x, λ) ≡ 1
2
(
1− x
1− (1− x)λαuαd +
x+ t (1− x)
t− [x+ t (1− x)]λαuαd
)
and B (λ) ≡ 2
αd − λαu .
From the initial demand functions and symmetry, we have:
n∗u = C (x)−D (x) (p∗u + αup∗d) and n∗d = αdn∗u − p∗d , (20)
where:
C (x) ≡ 1− x/2
1− (1− x)αuαd and D (x) ≡
1− x
1− (1− x)αuαd .
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It is then straightforward to solve (18), (19) and (20) in order to determine the equilibrium
prices and demands:
p∗u =
C (x) (B (λ)− αdA (x, λ))
∆ (x, λ)
and p∗d =
C (x)A (x, λ)
∆ (x, λ)
,
n∗u =
C (x)A (x, λ)B (λ)
∆ (x, λ)
and n∗d =
(αdB (λ)− 1)C (x)A (x, λ)
∆ (x, λ)
,
where:
∆ (x, λ) ≡ A (x, λ)B (λ) + (αu − αd)D (x)A (x, λ) +D (x)B (λ) .
Finally, equilibrium platform profits are:
Π∗C (x, λ) =
C (x)2A (x, λ)
[
B (λ)2 − A (x, λ)]
∆ (x, λ)2
.
It is easily verified that:
• A (0, λ) = 1
1−λαuαd , C (0) = D (0) =
1
1−αuαd and ∆ (0, λ) =
4−(αd+αu)(αd+λαu)
(1−λαuαd)(1−αuαd)(αd−λαu) ,
leading to Π∗C (0, λ) = Π
∗
M (λ) (expression 10 in the text);
• A (1, λ) = 1
2(t−λαuαd) , C (1) =
1
2
, D (1) = 0 and ∆ (1, λ) = 1
(t−λαuαd)(αd−λαu) , leading to
Π∗C (1, λ) =
t
2
− α
2
d
16
− 6αdαuλ+ α
2
uλ
2
16
,
which is equal to Π∗C (λ) (expression 11 in the text).
Calculating the derivatives of Π∗C (x, λ) in x and λ (for general x and λ) is inextricable. We
have used Mathematica to graph Π∗C (x, 0) and Π
∗
C (x, 1) as functions of x and Π
∗
C (x0, λ) as
a function of λ for various values of x0: see Figures 1 and 2 in Section 6.3.
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